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REVISTA IEEE 9

http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 237 Salvador Sánchez Tapia Defining a model for analysis of civil-military relations... At the one extreme of the spectrum we find CMR patterns that deny the armed forces even a limited space of professional autonomy. In these regimes, all the decisions are taken by the civilians without giving the military a voice on them or systematically disregarding its advice. In this model, the politicians impose the military the criteria for accession to the profession and the curricula in the education institutions; define criteria for promotion to generalship and impose their candidates or routinely manipulate the recommendations of the professionals; decide on major weapons systems without due consideration to the operational requirements advanced by the technicians; and force on them decisions on the code of conduct, roles and missions or on other administrative issues. At the extreme of absolute autonomy there would be CMR regimes in which the armed forces can decide without the least civilian interference on each and every one of the fields considered in the area. The military is in a position of strength because the civilians are weak and fear military power, because they neglect military issues, or because they have an absolute trust on the soldiers. The ideal point of balance lays somewhere in between. In an ideal CMR pattern, the civilians trust the armed forces and exert a loose laissez faire, laissez passer control over military management of the profession, only occasionally intervening to moderate slight deviations. This requires a solid institutional framework with a clear chain of command to supervise the institution and, above all, civilians that understand the armed forces, their role and their professional needs, and soldiers that have genuine respect for the legitimacy of their political masters and that do not take advantage of that loose control to “shirk” in the sense Feaver uses the term.14 In an ideal CMR pattern, the system promotes individuals based on professional criteria of merit and potential to assume the responsibilities inherent to the various ranks of generalship. In such a pattern, PME facilitates exchange with civil society, grants equal opportunities to all citizens irrespective of their social extraction, leaves to the military the responsibility to determine curricula that are consistent with the principles of democratic CMR, and facilitates smooth integration in society of those members of the armed forces not willing to continue a military career. In what concerns procurement and acquisitions, the ideal CMR pattern cares for the operational needs of the armed forces –adjusted to the roles and missions determined at the political level-, and genuinely tries to satisfy them within the budgetary possibilities. Political considerations do not diminish the overall effectiveness of the armed forces. This authority for self-management is reciprocated by a scrupulous respect to the principles of democratic CMR. The military does not use it to shirk, or to impose on 14  FEAVER, Peter D., Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2003), p. 55.

REVISTA IEEE 9
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