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REVISTA IEEE 9

http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 243 Salvador Sánchez Tapia Defining a model for analysis of civil-military relations... the limits of what is acceptable in democratic CMR, and with the certitude that his advice will be heard.23 Finally, the analysis should look into the existence of rules to manage dissent. Legitimate disagreement is an unavoidable part to any collaborative decision-making process.24 The issue is what the military does in case of serious disagreement with the adopted policy: is resignation used as a way to show dissent? Does it take place quietly, or is it publicized as a way to exercise pressure on the politicians and to destabilize civilian authority? The ideal pattern in this area lies between two extremes. At the one side, there may be a CMR model, usually non-institutionalized, in which the military does not participate at all, or in which his input is insufficiently considered by political elites uneducated in security issues and guided by ideological prejudices about the military. Policy crafting is chaotic, follows no method, is done by a reduced group of trusted agents and, therefore, not appropriately vetted. The result is suboptimal policy. At the other extreme we would find an equally non-institutionalized process, dominated by the functional imperative, and in which the military enjoys too much of a voice. In this pattern, the military uses its position of advantage as technical advisor to advocate options and influence policy outcomes in a way that serve the parochial ends of the armed forces –or a part of them- over the general interest. Decisions are taken by a small group of individuals and systematically reflect the military point of view, ignoring other legitimate inputs. Because decisions normally satisfy the military, dissent is hardly present. When it occurs, the military uses any tool –including resignation- as a way to press the politicians. In the ideal pattern, there is a procedure –formalized or not- for security policy definition that methodically considers all the different aspects of the security challenges facing the state and that gives voice to all the stakeholders of the security community. The technical advice of the military is heard and adequately pondered by policymakers educated in security matters. The process takes place in a cooperative climate that favors candid exchange of views. The military does not use its position as technical expert as an advantage to promote its parochial interests. Dissent is managed internally, even in case of resignation. The application of the model to the United Kingdom and Greece (Table II) shows how both countries have institutionalized processes for security policy making, differently conceived on account of their respective political cultures. In both countries, the process is under the democratic control of solid political institutions, although in the United Kingdom it is less regulated, which is consistent with a political culture that dislikes prescriptive legislation. 23  ULRICH, “Infusing Normative Civil-Military Relations Principles,” 665. 24  Ibid. 663.

REVISTA IEEE 9
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