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REVISTA IEEE 9

Javier Lion Bustillo The Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra; new actors in... 297 Resentment against Syrian hegemony came to a head following the death of Hafez al-Assad in 2000, who was succeeded by his son Bashar. Moreover, the succession crisis coincided with adverse international sentiment towards Damascus, with the U.S., Saudi Arabia and France demanding the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon. The assassination of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri (2004) triggered a wave of nationalism in the country, calling for the immediate withdrawal of Assad’s troops, which ultimately occurred in 2005. However, Assad used his allies (Hezbollah and Amal) to exert their influence on the neighbouring country, which split into two coalitions: the March 14 and March 8 Alliances. The former was in favour of a rapprochement with Washington and Riyadh, while the latter advocated cooperation with Damascus and Tehran. National politics were taking on an increasingly confessional tone, with the March 14 Alliance dominated by the Sunni Future Movement (led by the Hariri family), the March 8 Alliance supported primarily by Shiite forces and the Christians divided between the two coalitions. Consequently, coexistence between the two has been extremely fragile in recent years, with regular outbreaks of violence and the fear of another civil war9. Tension over the distribution of power has been ongoing since the departure of the Syrian troops. However, the resort to force has always been contained by Hezbollah’s enormous superiority in this field. This political, social and paramilitary organisation emerged in response to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982, when a faction split from the Shiite Amal Party and settled in Bekaa, where the members received training from Iranian military experts. After demonstrating its prowess in combat, the organisation managed to forge an identity as the resistance movement against Israel and a defender of Lebanese sovereignty, which is Hezbollah’s main source of legitimacy. Unlike other paramilitary groups that were largely disarmed following the Taif Peace Treaty (1989), Hezbollah’s continued retention of weapons was tolerated by Syria and remains a source of tension in Lebanese politics10. The weapons supplied by Iran and Hezbollah’s extensive experience in warfare against Israel explain its military superiority, even with respect to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The latter institution has traditionally garnered greater popular support because of its neutral stance in political disputes. In recent years, however, it has been the target of growing criticism from Islamic groups and some members of the Future Movement, who believe it is collaborating with Hezbollah, and for its overly harsh treatment of the Sunni population11. 9  CHEMALY, Rita, “Le printemps 2005 au Liban. Entre mythes et réalités”, Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009. FAKHOURY MÜHLBACHER, Tamirace, “Democracy and Power-Sharing in Stormy Weather. The Case of Lebanon”, Wiesbaden: Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, 2009, pp. 261-300. 10  PALMER HARIK, Judith, “Hezbollah: The Changing Face of Terrorism”, London: Tauris, 2004. 11  NERGUIZIAN, Aram, “The Lebanese Armed Forces. Challenges and Opportunities in Post- Syria Lebanon”, Washington, Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2009, pp. 23-26. BELONCLE, Edouard, “Prospects of SSR in Lebanon”, Journal of Security Sector Management, vol. 4, no. 4, 2006, pp. 3-6. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee

REVISTA IEEE 9
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