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Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 9 / 2017 http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 302 of opposition militia (which included ISIL and al-Nusra) made important advances close to the Lebanese border (in the Qalamoun Mountains), particularly in the M-1 motorway that connects Tartus and Homs, and in the south of the country, in Dera´a and Quneitra27. Opposition control of the town of al-Qusayr, very close to the Lebanese province of Akkar, allowed the latter to help supply fighters and food, which was further facilitated by the presence of numerous Syrian refugees. The death of the Islamist Sheikh Ahmed Abdul Wahid at an army checkpoint in May 2012 caused major social unrest in the region, forcing the LAF to reduce its troops and surveillance activities and enabling jihadist action to go largely unchecked. However, the climate of insecurity that ensued made it evident that the withdrawal of the LAF had been a mistake and once again intense efforts were made to control the border. This sparked strong criticism from many sectors of the Sunni community against Prime Minister Mikati whose government was, in turn, being pressured by Hezbollah to take a more sympathetic stance towards Damascus. This growing isolation led to Mikati’s resignation in March 2013 which again led to a complex, almost year-long negotiation before the new Prime Minister, Tammam Salam, was able to form a government28. Given the military difficulties experienced by Assad’s regime and the capability of opposition militia to control some parts of the common border, Hezbollah became increasingly willing to support the Baathist leader from early 2013 onwards. This prompted Assad’s forces to target the M-1 motorway and the cities of Homs and al- Qusayr, where it launched major attacks that were successful, largely thanks to the decisive intervention of Hezbollah. As a result of the pressure exerted by the LAF, the Shiite militia and Assad’s troops, the activities of Sunni jihadist groups in Akkar and the Homs region were greatly reduced29. Hezbollah’s intervention sparked major criticism from the March 14 Alliance, which believed that Hassan Nasrallah’s party was putting the country at risk in order to protect its allies in Damascus. In response, the Lebanese Sunni community met Assad’s repression of the majority-Sunni opposition with increased feelings of frustration and helplessness. However, anything that causes inter-religious tension in a country such as Lebanon is likely to trigger strong reactions from other communities, whose support is vital for the country’s government. This therefore placed the Future Movement in a very delicate position. If it allowed itself to be carried away by the anti-Shiite rhetoric, it might win the support of the more radical Sunni; albeit at the price of being linked, in the eyes of other communities, to Salafist Jihadism, which was greatly feared by 27  At the time, ISIL was only present in Qalamoun, but not in the south. Since then, it has established links in the area. CAFARELLA, op. cit., pp. 27-36. 28  RIFI, Gassan, “Chaos Reigns in North Lebanon, Where Military Has Lost Control”, Al Monitor, 15/06/2012. 29  LEIGH, Karen, “State of the Battle: Fighting Tooth and Nail for Qalamoun”, Syria Deeply, 05/12/2013.

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