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Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 9 / 2017 http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 310 been in connection with anti-Israeli activities or the Syrian Civil War. For its part, the Syrian army became lax about controlling its border, which led to a number of incidents provoked by the Damascus authorities54. Since 2014, opposition militia (primarily al-Nusra) have been putting increasing pressure on the area, mainly through the harassment of local resident Druze communities that are unsympathetic to Assad’s regime, but neither are they willing to collaborate with the jihadists. During the summer of that year, the militia advanced through Golan territory controlled by Syria; after reaching Quneitra, they continued northwards to the town of Jubata al-Khashab, close to Mount Hermon, and under the direction of Sheikh Abu Hassan al-Ramlawi. However, other towns in the area fell into the hands of the Syrian army and its Druze allies in the National Defence Forces (a self-defence militia). Widespread fighting between the two sides ensued in an attempt to take control of this highly strategic space. This further fuelled the fears of the Lebanese Druze in the Rashaya district that the jihadists would try to cross the border and settle in their area55. In response, the Druze leader, Walid Jumblatt, travelled to the region, to Wadi al-Taym, to coordinate defence operations against the threat of ethnic cleansing56. The escalation in fighting on the Syrian side of the border has placed the Lebanese Druze in a delicate situation, given that if they decide to set up self-defence groups like those established by the Christians in the north of the country, their Sunni neighbours might see this as a threat, thus creating instability in interdenominational relations. However, refusing to rearm would place them in an extremely vulnerable position. This situation suggests that, since 2014, global jihadist groups such as IS and al- Nusra have clearly decided to become the main players in Lebanese territory, which can be interpreted in several ways. Politicians of the Future Movement insist that the jihadist assault is simply the result of Hezbollah’s involvement in Lebanon and the unfair treatment afforded to many Sunni. Consequently, a solution to the crisis would require the withdrawal of the Shiite militia from the neighbouring country, in addition to a commitment on their part to disarm. For its part, Hezbollah claims that the jihadist threat existed before its militia got involved in Syria, and that it did so precisely to try to block this danger, in which case it would be necessary to strengthen national unity by supporting the Resistance and the LAF. In other words, while the Future Movement wants to exploit the jihadist threat to get Hezbollah to disarm, the Shiite party is using the same threat as a motive for rebuilding its image as the defender of the nation, thus providing justification for retaining its weapons57. 54  MIDDLE EAST UNDOF (GOLAN HEIGHTS), March 2015 Monthly Forecast, 27/02/2015. 55  BLANFORD, Nicholas, “Druze on edge over jihadi incursion fears”, The Daily Star, 15/11/2014. 56  AL-ALI, op. cit. 57  EINAV, Omer, “The Problem that is Also a Solution: Lebanese Fears Play into Hezbollah Hands”, INSS Insight, no. 642, Tel Aviv, 14/12/2014.

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