418 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 6 / 2015 of missile-launching submarines and, since 2008, to reduce its nuclear missiles by 33%, and its nuclear warheads by 50% relative to the number in 1991.39 In 1997, the fixed nuclear targets were deprogrammed, and the policy of selection of objectives toward any potential aggressor with nuclear weapons was reoriented, regardless of their entity. In 2001, under the presidency of Jacques Chirac, it was announced that the French nuclear capacity could also be directed against regional powers and states that developed or had weapons of mass destruction, and not only nuclear capacity. In 2006, a new change was introduced by including, among the reasons that would justify a nuclear attack, the defense of strategic supplies for the survival of France and the defense of allied countries.40 In conclusion, the doctrine of the use of the force de frappe came close to the Anglo Saxon postulates, despite the fact that Paris still keeps the political and strategic independence of France in resorting to nuclear weapons.41 In spite of that, it is necessary to highlight that these reductions have gone along with the modernization of missiles as well as of available nuclear weapons. Since 2010, M45 submarine launched ballistic missiles are being replaced by the new M51, with longer range and greater precision. The air missiles are also being modernized: since 2009, its Mirage 2000N aircraft are being substituted by the new Rafale F3, and the ASMP air-to-ground missiles are being replaced by the more modern ASMP-A, of longer range, greater stealth, and a broader array of flight paths. Thus, it seems obvious that the French governments, regardless of the political color, and the public debate about the cost of the nuclear arsenal, are not willing to relinquish nuclear weapons or to limit its capability of attack, understanding deterrence as the fundamental pillar of the survival of France as a relevant power in the international scenario. In relation with conventional capabilities, since 1996, with the abolition of the universal military service, and in spite of the recruitment of professional volunteers, the reduction of troops had continued in subsequent years. The decrease of the troops came with the adaptation of the organization and operation structure: between 1996 and 2007, fifty regiments, ten General Staffs, and over two hundred organisms of different nature were eliminated from the organization chart of the Army.42 39 These decisions would take place after a strong public debate about the deterrence capability of France. In this regard, see the numerous contributions included in PASCALON, Pierre and PARIS, Henry (dirs.). French nuclear deterrence in question(s). Paris: L’Harmattan, 2006. On the other hand, a synthesis of these reductions can be found in: Commission for National and Armed Forces Defense. Rapport d’information relatif à une revue capacitaire des armées. París: Assemblé Nationale, 2014. 40 DEBOUZY, Olivier. “French nuclear deterrence doctrine: an aggiornamento”. European Affairs, vol. 7, nº 1, pp. 1-22. 41 TETRAIS, Bruno. A comparison between US, UK and French nuclear policies and doctrines, París: Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, 2007. 42 The 53 active duty infantry regiments in 1996 ended up being 20 in 2010; in the same time period, the cavalry and armored brigades went from 25 to 12; artillery from 28 to 12; engineers from http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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