344 Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies N. 5 / 2015 Tensions lead directly to Washington, as it is considered that its alliances propitiate antagonism from countries with territorial differences to Beijing.24 From a Chinese perspective, the United States is the key to clashes with its Southeast Asian neighbours, and the principal factor complicating its Japanese strategy, aside from the traditional obstacle that it represents for the reunification of Taiwan. The moderate stance of previous governments did not improve external circumstances, nor did it prevent the Obama administration from turning its attention towards the East, neither did it temper the tense climate with Japan, the Philippines or Vietnam. In view of the debatable efficacy of this stance attributable to Chinese interests and on the basis of this new evaluation of its surrounding environment, Beijing appears to have come to the conclusion that it had to proactively reconfigure this external situation. It was no longer a question of choice, but a strategic imperative, whereby President Xi urged his senior officials to “be creative and show greater initiative in achieving diplomatic work towards surrounding countries”.25 This “activism” is feasible if one has the necessary resources. For the first time, Beijing has the capacity to exercise control over its periphery, a factor that permits it to act on existing risks; while at the same time it is legitimised by nationalist public opinion. A rising China -in the view of many citizens, army officers, political leaders and academic experts- ought not to fear using its power in the defence of its national interests.26 The most obvious manifestation of these new capabilities is in the economic arena: in 2010, Chinese GDP was ahead of Japan, thus transforming the Asian hierarchy of the last hundred years and moving into second position in the world ranking, just one place behind the United States. The global financial crisis contributed to China’s upturn in comparison with western economies weighed down by serious structural problems. Growth in defence expenses has similarly promoted China’s considerable belief in its possibilities. In 2008, its military budget was the second largest in the world, as can be observed from the rapid modernisation of its forces; particularly in its air, naval and missile capabilities. While for decades US dominance in Asia 24 HEATH, Timothy R. “China and the U.S. Alliance System”, The Diplomat, 11 June 2014, http:// thediplomat.com/2014/06/china-and-the-u-s-alliance-system/ (last consultation 12-1-2015). 25 YAN Xuetong. “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, vol. 7, no. 2 (Summer 2014), pp. 156 y 166, http://www.imir.tsinghua.edu. cn/publish/iis/7236/20120308004022054904369/2013-9.pdf (last consultation 9-9-2014). See also, CHEN Xulong. “Xi Jinping Opens A New Era of China’s Periphery Diplomacy”, China-US Focus, 9 November 2013, http://www.chinausfocus.com/foreign-policy/xin-jinping-opens-a-new-era-of-chinas- periphery-diplomacy/ (last consultation 12-1-2015). 26 ZHAO Suisheng. “Foreign Policy Implications of Chinese Nationalism Revisited: The Strident Turn”, Journal of Contemporary China, vol. 22, no. 82 (2013), pp. 535-553, http://www.tandfonline. com/doi/abs/10.1080/10670564.2013.766379#.VDjqoL5VvIM (last consultation 12-1-2015). http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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