531 José Miguel Alía Plana Rules of engagement and governance of agramante’s camp to the effects of the attack. Secondly, it becomes another political sub-machine, subordinate to the ROEs-machine. In any case, it is conceived of as a limitation of fighting: although it’s mere possibility restricts the scope of what is feasible in operations. It occurs,65 especially as fratricide,66 because the struggle is not a mathematical issue. “Precision combat”67 (another postmodern conceptual map/concept) that theoretically must limit these events, does not eliminate human error or the smog of war. Collateral damage, understood as a political sub-group, nuances the effects that the knowledge of casualties could bring about in public opinion, with repercussions on government support, decision-making and future military actions. It is a tool used by the authorities in order to divulge their discourse on ROEs, violence, damages inflicted and suffered; excesses produced, violations of norms regarding targets, etc. The extra-limitations would not be crimes of war, but unintentional, incontrollable errors, acceptable statistics in accordance with data and mathematical models of quality and confidence in what was planned. It is sufficient to bear in mind the decisions of the Tribunal of the Former Yugoslavia on the 200 Metre Standard in the case of general Gotovina.68 This brings us back to organisational engineering processes, to production categories of targets. It provides a summary in the form of several questions that should be raised before the attack: has the target been identified as the legal objective according to the rights of armed conflicts and the ROEs of the operation? Are there any civilians, non-fighters, civil objectives or environmental considerations in existence in the area of the attack that could be affected by the range of arms employed to take out the target? Can the damages be reduced or mitigated, in the case of striking the target with the weaponry and ROEs selected or can another be employed with less aggressive ROEs, without prejudice to the operation?. 65 MALDONADO GARCÍA, E. Buscando la interoperabilidad: la identificación in combate in operaciones multinacionales. Escuela Superior de las FAS, Madrid, Monografía del Curso de Estado Mayor 2003-2004 (19 April 2004), p. 6. 66 REYNOLDS, J. D., Collateral damage on the 21st century battlefield: enemy exploitation of the law of armed conflict, and the struggle for a moral high ground, Air Force Law Review (winter 2005), in http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m6007/is_56/ai_n14700122. 67 The capacity for locating objectives, acting with the appropriate systems, achieving the effects demanded by operations and evaluating the results. Cf. Joint Vision 2020, Washington: US Government Printing Office, 2000, p. 20. 68 Paragraph 1898 of the sentence handed down by the International Penal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Abril 2011. Margin of error (applied in the bombings of Knin, Benkovac and Obrovac, Operation “Storm” in Croatia); if projectiles fall within a radius of 200 metres of designated targets, then the attack is considered to be lawful; while if they fall outside that radius they are considered to be illegal, being looked upon as indiscriminate against persons and goods. . This “200 Metre Standard” did not last for long, it is not contained in any norms on rights in armed conflict nor artillery treaty, nor have magistrates justified the reasons for determining the legality of such a measure: Why 200 metros and not 175, or 250? The tribunal did not clarify the matter. Cf. UNITED NATIONS, “International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia since 1991, http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee
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