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REVISTA IEEE 9

Javier Lion Bustillo The Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra; new actors in... 299 searches in Nahr al-Bared and the Islamists retaliated by murdering 25 soldiers while they slept, thus unleashing a major conflict. However, the army’s limited resources and the jihadists’ strong positions resulted in the battle becoming a protracted siege that lasted until early September, when the last strongholds in the hands of Fatah al-Islam were taken over by the LAF16. Many theories have been put forward to explain the rapid rise and activity of this organisation. Some authors have pointed to Syria’s tolerance in allowing the fighters to cross its territory, which suggests a degree of complicity by Damascus in the desire to destabilise Lebanon. Others have pointed out that the internal security forces (close to the Future Movement) showed clear permissiveness in allowing the jihadists to settle in Nahr al-Bared and maintaining close ties with them, while Saudi Arabia and the Future Movement provided financial support to strengthen the Sunni jihadists’ position with respect to Hezbollah. Finally, there are suspicions of contact between Fatah al-Islam and Al-Qaeda in an attempt to find a new space for the jihad in northern Lebanon or simply to use the region as a support base for its activities in other countries. In any event, it would appear that different Lebanese and foreign actors tried to exploit Fatah al-Islam for their own ends17. The risk of another civil war resurfaced in May 2008, when Hezbollah saw a number of decisions made by the Lebanese government as an attempt to deprive it of its military power18. In response, it occupied West Beirut, the stronghold of the Hariri family, and defeated armed groups of the Future Movement, which was a huge humiliation for the Sunni. However, it was again possible to dissipate the tension and a commitment was reached (the Doha Agreement). This gave the March 8 parties real powers of veto within the government, which many Sunni saw as a sign that the Future Movement was incapable of protecting the interests of their community19. Jihadist groups tried to challenge Hezbollah’s military hegemony in an area where the Shiite organisation did not have a presence - the city of Tripoli. Here they were able to take advantage of their position in the Bab al-Tabbaneh neighbourhood to harass the Alawite Muslim residents of Jabal Mohsen. From this point on, there were regular attacks and reprisals, which forced the LAF to intervene to prevent the fighting from spreading to other areas, while at the same time trying not to get directly involved Transnationalism, Intellectuals and the Media”, London: Hurst & Co., 2013, pp. 61-66. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, “Nurturing Instability: Lebanon´s Palestinian Refugee Camps”, Middle East Report, no. 84, 2009, pp. 28-9. 16  GADE, op. cit., pp. 28-32. 17  ABDEL-LATIF, op. cit., pp. 18-9. ROUGIER, Bernard, “The Sunni Tragedy”, op. cit., pp. 82- 170. 18  These decisions were an attempt to control Hezbollah’s telephone network and the dismissal of the head of security at Beirut airport, who was close to the organisation. 19  ABDEL-LATIF, op. cit., pp. 21-22. RABIL, Robert G., “Salafism in Lebanon: From Apoliticism to Transnational Yihadism”, Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2014, pp. 191-210. http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee

REVISTA IEEE 9
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