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Journal of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies Núm. 9 / 2017 http://revista.ieee.es/index.php/ieee 300 as this would have compromised their neutrality. Another problematic aspect was that many detained Salafi militants were sent to overcrowded prisons which became recruitment grounds for jihadist organisations. Upon their release, many of them were determined to take the path of violence, while others formed “dormant cells” waiting to strike when the time was right20. Following the fall of the Future Movement government in 2011, a new government headed by Prime Minister Najib Mikati was formed, thus depriving the Hariri party of much of its power to control the Sunni (coupled with their own financial problems). In this new context, the alliance with Islamist groups was considerably weakened and the balance of power within the community began to tip towards the latter, which was further aided by the unfolding of events in the region21. THE IMPACT OF THE SYRIAN CIVIL WAR Following the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War (2011), Lebanon became increasingly embroiled in the events taking place on the other side of the border, which resulted in the radicalisation of religious tensions. Therefore, while many Lebanese Sunni were sympathetic to the uprising against the Assad family, whom they believed to be responsible for the grievances suffered by their community, many Shiites saw it as an attempt to overthrow an ally regime22. Mikati’s government sought to avoid the risk of internal confrontation by promoting an extensive agreement on the disassociation from Syrian issues, which was crystallised in the Baabda Declaration (11 July 2012). In fact, it took an extremely cautious approach in an attempt to avoid tension. However, the problem was that both the Sunni and Shiite parties were secretly helping their respective allies in Syria. Hezbollah initially supported Assad with intelligence and training, later going on to organise Shiite militia in Shiite towns on the Syrian side of the border23. On the other hand, the Sunni, through the different political parties (including the Future Movement), sent all kinds of aid to the Syrian opposition militia, either across the 20  LEFÈVRE, Raphaël, “The Roots of Crisis in Northern Lebanon”, Carnegie Middle East Center, 2014. pp. 16-20. SAAB, Bilal, “Beware of radicalism in Lebanese prisons”, The Daily Star, 23/08/2010. 21  VLOEBERGHS, Ward, “The Hariri Political Dynasty after the Arab Spring”, Mediterranean Politics, vol. 17, no. 2, 2012, pp. 245-246. KHASHAN, Hilal, “The Political Isolation of Lebanese Sunnis”, Middle East Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 3, 2013, pp. 70-71. 22  LION BUSTILLO, Javier, “Siria y Líbano: entre la disociación y el desbordamiento”, Revista CIDOB d´AfersInternacionals, nº 108, 2014, pp. 218-221. 23  INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP, “Lebanon’s Hezbollah Eastward to Syria”, Middle East Report, no. 153, 2014, pp. 3-10.

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