Hélène Gicquel
Despite all the difficulties to access and remain in space, the
benefits of its use are immense. Many activities of our daily life
would be impossible without the support of the satellite network
in space, and the situation is no different from the security and
defence point of view. Without satellites, many weapon systems
would simply not work, and both decision-making and the move-ment
and deployment of forces would be dramatically slowed down.
Satellites have three essential uses for defence. First, observa-tion
and surveillance, either optical or by radar. Second, supporting
telecommunication systems. Finally, the latest development is to
use them for geographic positioning, enabling a receiver on the
Earth’s surface to know its geographic location at any time by con-necting
to several satellites.
A fourth potential capability, which fortunately has hardly been
developed, is the deployment of weapons, in particular nuclear
weapons, in space. The danger of orbital nuclear weapons, initially
developed both by the United States and the Soviet Union in the
1960s, had a lot to do with the signing of the Outer Space Treaty of
1967 which, since then, has considerably constrained what can be
done in space from a strategic viewpoint.
In general, the Treaty established three basic principles that
have since become the cornerstone of space exploration and
strategy:
—Outer space is a global commons of all Humanity.
—Outer space should be used for peaceful purposes, and the
deployment of nuclear armament, weapon tests, the conduct of mil-itary
exercises or the establishment of military bases, facilities and
fortifications are all strictly prohibited.
—States are accountable for their activities in space and main-tain
sovereignty over the objects they place there.
CONFRONTATION WELL BEYOND THE EARTH’S
ATMOSPHERE
The increasing role of satellites in security and defence inevitably
led nations to consider how to neutralize enemy satellite networks
in a potential conflict. However, the solutions are still expensive
and technically complex. There are several alternatives to neutral-ize
a satellite. The easiest one is electronic warfare, jamming the
reception of their broadcasts. This might be relatively easy with
satellites located in very high orbits sending weak signals, such as
geographic positioning satellites (located at approximately 20,000
kilometres) or geostationary communication satellites, with orbits
synchronized with the Earth’s rotation, located at about 35,000 ki-lometres.
However, there are numerous countermeasures to tackle
jamming, usually focused on increasing the power of the broad-casted
signal.
The physical destruction of a satellite is a more expensive and
difficult measure, although it is also definitive. This requires send-ing
a missile up to a height of hundreds or thousands of kilome-tres,
with a guidance system enabling it to intercept a relatively
small object moving at a speed ranging from 11,000 to 27,000
kilometres per hour. Even when the target is a self-owned satellite,
the location of which is perfectly known at all times, the techno-logical
challenge is huge. So far, four countries have successfully
conducted anti-satellite (ASAT) tests. The United States destroyed
two of its own satellites, in 1985 and 2008. China successfully
completed an ASAT test in 2007, destroying an inoperative satel-lite.
India was the next power to prove its capabilities in 2019, with
August 2020 Revista Española de Defensa 41