268 Revista del Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos Núm. 1 / 2013 pulation that it seeks to gain support from (whether by means of financing, recruiting soldiers for combat or as a source of information) is very much conditional upon the possible existence of rival groups that compete to capture these resources. In contexts in which there is no rivalry due to the “extraction” of resources, it is simpler to consolidate, as well as carry out the centralised control of the community. We are referring to those situations in which it is unnecessary to make use of coercive measures, nor to commit violence on the civilian population1. Following this line of argument, exactly the converse will take place in those cases in which there is effective competition –or the sensation of a threat- owing to the loss of control of these resources, whether amongst insurgent factions or due to the intervention of the particular government. In these scenarios, the levels of violence will, in all probability, be higher. This is a Darwinian process in which there is no role for the character of the primus inter pares, in which power relationships are, in turn, understood as a zero sum game. Having reached this point we have to wonder why there is greater freedom of action for those insurgent groups that operate in the circumstances indicated. In seeking to find an answer to this question, we start from the basis of a set of specific limitations that place conditions on the relationship between the insurgency and the population that wishes to feed off it. The scarcity of resources, in many of the scenarios that entail a conflict between insurgent groups, generates incentives to reach contractual agreements with the inhabitants of that territory. These include the provision of certain services such as, for example, security, education or medical care. If the rebels do not come up to the mark when it comes to providing these services in a satisfactory way, it is likely that the population would tend to run away from the insurgents. If, on the other hand, they are able to successfully manage the provision and guarantee of these basic services, a quid pro quo is established in which everybody wins. At the same time, this monopoly situation enables the insurgency to make use of a constant source of supplies. Competition however, changes the relationship that the insurgents establish with the local population. It especially affects the decision-making that is carried out within the different factions that make up the movement, which are more disposed to coercion, precisely because of a consequence of the existing rivalry. Under these circum- 1 While this is not the subject of discussion in this article, it is important to make two qualifications on this point. Firstly, these contractual relationships are mostly based on the insurgency providing social care to the population that it seeks to gain support from. However, this provision of services of a different nature such as educational programmes, health, employment, caring for the victims of a dispute, and whose objective is to offer the friendly face of the insurgency as well as the creation of client networks, starts from one fundamental premise: the existence of liberated areas that enable this. Secondly, when we are talking about violence being committed, we are referring to the provision of the use of auxiliary tools. These are instruments that feed the insurgency such as terrorism, as a consequence of the asymmetry of forces.
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