371 Luis de la Corte Ibáñez To what extent do global terrorism and organised criminality converge against Iraqi oil distribution infrastructures could have been done with the aim of the corresponding cuts in the supply benefitting the particular black market in fuel48. 4.3 Forms of collaboration Almost all of the criminal activities that we have just highlighted as being perpetrated by jihadists have been undertaken against a backdrop of some degree of cooperation with the local criminal networks and organisations. In fact, the overall examination of the scenarios selected here shows an entire catalogue of alternative options of collaboration between terrorists and organised criminals. Whilst almost all of these have been pointed out to some extent in our previous comments, it seems timely to briefly explain the most significant options. Incorporation into the production chains related to illegal markets. As we have already seen, the jihadist involvement in the drug business and in other unlawful trade has been made possible by their position of dominating the territories where these crops are grown or pass through. Nevertheless, this form of control can only be profitable if it translates into the setting up of a form of ongoing economic partnership with one or several of other groups involved in the same business. So for example, in order to make the most of the drugs business, the partners or former allies of Al Qaida in Afghanistan and Pakistan have had a kind of commercial relationship with the growers, professional traffickers, men of war and corrupt government officials. In the same way, in both Iraq and the Western Sahara, the jihadists have collaborated with smuggling networks. Tactical alliances. Another form of collaboration that has more or less stayed the course consists of the formation of alliances or collaboration agreements with groups of professional criminals. Possibly the purest form of this way of working has taken place in the Sahara. In fact, and as several reports have borne witness to, the particular MOJWA jihadist organisation was crated in 2011 as the result of a coalition that was formed at its outset by a combination of militants who had split away from AQIM and local criminal elements. This was possibly strengthened by the money that was contributed to it by Cherif Ould Taher and Mohamed Ould Ahmed, two powerful criminal bosses of the region, with long experience in drug trafficking and kidnappings. Sub-contracting of criminal services. Imitating an increasing pattern of use within the general sphere of organised criminality, the jihadists that operate in several scenarios that are observed here have sub-contracted the services of criminal gangs and other people with illegal expertise in certain criminal activities, so as to economise on efforts or to avoid any other risk. Thus, in some occasions, the Iraq jihadists have 48 OEHME III, op. cit.
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