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112 Memorial de Caballería, n.º 90 - Diciembre 2020
TRADUCCIONES
ROBOTS AND RECONNAISSANCE
We May Never Be Stealthy and Deliberate Again
By COL J. Frederick Dente and CPT Timothy Lee
From iron blades and crossbows to armored vehicles and precision-guided munitions, the character
of war is constantly evolving. Nations expend massive amounts of energy and capital to present
new dilemmas for adversaries across multiple domains. Often these technical advances occur in a
vacuum, and we fail to develop the tactics and doctrine to fully leverage the new capability. At an
even more fundamental level, we often fail to examine how these new technical capabilities change
the underlying assumptions about the character of war in the first place.
Semi-autonomous ground-based robots, once a dream of the past, are the next change in warfare
the U.S. military and its adversaries are developing to gain and maintain dominance on the
battlefield. However, the proliferation of advanced technology such as the Robotic Combat Vehicle
(RCV) on the battlefield at the lowest level will fundamentally change the way Soldiers fight tomorrow’s
battles, and it will call into question the very doctrine and methodology the Army uses to
train its warfighters. While there are varying opinions on whether the use of RCVs will ultimately
enable or hinder reconnaissance and security (R&S) operations, the Army must continue to address
the inadequacies of its ability to execute ground R&S operations to fight and win the next
major ground war.
This article will highlight the foreseeable changes in doctrine that must be considered by first
examining the advantages and disadvantages of three long-standing ideas in cavalry doctrine and
then describe how these ideas will inevitably change with the integration of the RCV to effectively
move forward into the 21st Century.
TACTICAL MOBILITY
Cavalry formations have long served as a catalyst to transform the concepts of maneuver warfare
into a battlefield capability. As maneuver is the essence of U.S. fighting doctrine, it requires the
means to seize or retain the initiative and to create or exploit offensive opportunities.
Commanders require a high degree of situational awareness and the time to mass and concentrate
superior combat power against the enemy at the right time and place for maneuver to be successful.
For centuries, the power of mobility has enabled cavalry formations to accomplish this task.
By remaining mobile and retaining freedom of maneuver, cavalry formations can provide a continuous
flow of combat information and intelligence to commanders, helping them cope with uncertainty,
make contact under favorable conditions, prevent surprise and facilitate timely decision-making.
Serving as the brigade commander’s «eyes and ears,» cavalry formations can deploy quickly, fight
for information and secure key terrain far in front of the main body to provide it with reaction time
and maneuver space.
However, commanders are frequently forced to sacrifice the amount of detail collected about the
operational environment to maintain their speed, as formations never seem to maneuver fast enough.
Moving quickly increases the risk by forcing Soldiers to potentially expose themselves to enemy
contact while trying to develop the situation. Yet moving more slowly may increase the risk to the
mission, as the cavalry may not secure key terrain before opposing forces begin their initial attack.
This problem has plagued commanders for centuries.