Varios
114
TRADUCCIONES
First, commanders have been frequently forced to sacrifice the amount of detail collected about
the operational environment to maneuver quickly; RCVs can effectively mitigate this gap entirely.
Commanders, once limited not only by the enemy and terrain but also by the human dimension, both
physically and mentally, now find themselves able to consistently maintain their overall operational
tempo. Unlike their manned fighting vehicle (MFV) counterparts, RCVs are not limited by Soldiers’
lack of sleep or endurance to maintain speed. The RCV can move ahead of the MFVs and quickly
secure key terrain, while scouts can move more deliberately behind the forward-line-of-robots
(FLOR) and forward-line-of-unmanned-aerial-vehicles (FLUA) to collect on terrain, civilian and
even infrastructure information requirements. (See Figure 1.)
By allowing RCVs to make first contact with the enemy and secure key terrain in front of the
BCT, commanders ultimately can mitigate both the risk to force and to mission that was previously
identified. Yet, while the RCV does enable commanders to maintain tactical mobility, it comes with
its own mobility limitations that will fundamentally change how reconnaissance doctrine, specifically
intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), is taught. Traditional instruction on IPB at
the reconnaissance schoolhouse focuses on how to best use terrain and how to use intervisibility
(IV) lines to conceal movement whether mounted, dismounted or even aerial to retain a position of
relative advantage.
However, as stated, RCVs are being used in front of formations to reduce risk and increase situational
awareness. As a result, IPB on the type of terrain that best suits robots may need to be more
emphasized than IPB for traditional mounted and dismounted maneuver. Furthermore, as these
RCVs must operate within line-of-sight to the control vehicle, a greater emphasis must be placed on
the three-dimensional aspect of the terrain and how it affects not just frequency-modulation communications
but also connectivity from the RCV to the control vehicle. This essential change in the
way scouts are taught IPB may not only be relevant, but it’s absolutely necessary.
Finally, because the basic capabilities for the RCVs used by the Army’s Next Generation Combat
Vehicle-Robotic Combat Vehicle (NGCV-RCV) team include artificial intelligence-assisted target
detection/recognition and anti-tank guided-missile capability, the ability for a cavalry formation
to fight for information is greatly increased. Commanders may never need to operate «stealthy»
again, as the RCV essentially mitigates the risk for a commander to expose his Soldiers to enemy
direct fire. The RCV ultimately provides the squadron commander with his own reaction time and
maneuver space and negates the need to be «stealthy.» Whereas current doctrine uses dismounts
in front of vehicles in a covert manner to make first contact with the enemy, the RCV enables the
commander to make first contact with robots. By operating in a more «forceful» capacity, these
RCVs develop the situation through action and can potentially suppress or fix the enemy while
the commander maneuvers his scouts to a position of relative advantage to engage and destroy the
enemy. Also, the RCV provides the cavalry commander with more firepower while still maintaining
economy-of-force to prevent decisive engagement.
However, despite these advantages, RCVs operating in a «forceful» manner are not without their
own inherent limitations. While future RCV capabilities must adhere to stringent requirements and
at least mirror their manned counterpart in terms of mobility and thermal signature, using RCVs
ahead of Soldiers and MFVs in a «stealthy» manner may not even be possible. While the RCV may
possess the same or even less thermal and noise signature of their manned counterparts, it becomes
extremely difficult to mimic the same physical and electromagnetic signature as a dismounted scout
moving in front of his vehicle to observe an IV line. Consequently, the cavalry commander may
never actually be able to specify «stealthy» as a reconnaissance tempo because he must account for
the RCVs. The impacts of this change would be astronomical; forcing cavalry formations to operate
solely in a forceful tempo increases the risk that RCVs were designed to mitigate. Furthermore,
organic task-organization to cavalry formations may also need to be reconsidered, as they may need
more firepower to serve only in a forceful tempo.
Memorial de Caballería, n.º 90 - Diciembre 2020